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Notes
Rule 10b-5: The Effect of the Insider Trading
Decisions on the Security Analyst
I. INTRODUCTION
Every intelligent transaction in today's business world in-
volves an analysis of the bargain by each party. As the item
bargained over becomes more complex, difficulties in analysis
necessarily increase. Assessing the value of part ownership in a
billion dollar, multi-product enterprise is indeed arduous. Mil-
lions of individual investors as well as thousands of financial
institutionsi assign this task to the professional security analyst.2
Whether an analyst is employed by a stock brokerage house or
investment advisory firm, trust company or bank trust depart-
ment, mutual fund managing concern or life insurance company,
his primary role is the same: to assist the investor in making
an investment decision.
This purpose coincides with the broad public policy of main-
taining an informed market for all business transactions.3  This
public policy is symbolized in the securities area by two major
federal laws-the Securities Act of 19334 and the Securities Ex-
1. Besides the 25 million direct holders of corporate securities,
numerous persons own mutual fund shares, have a beneficial interest
in a trust fund or in a pension fund which owns securities, or rely on the
fiscal health of a security-holding insurance company to assure perform-
ance of an insurance contract. See generally 1967 NEw YoRx STOCK
EXCHANGE ANNUAL REPORT 2, 18.
2. The Financial Analysts Federation has a membership of almost
12,000 persons, the majority of whom are full-time professional analysts.
Most analysts also belong to a local society. The New York Society of
Security Analysts, with about 4,000 members, is the largest of the local
groups. See The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1968, at 16, col. 3.
An analyst is either a "security analyst" in the strict sense, or a
"market analyst." The former, with which this Note is by its nature
concerned, evaluates particular securities while the latter studies stock
market action per se. Most security analysts concentrate their research
on common stocks. See RFPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuPRaIrs MAR-
KETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 332, (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL
STUDY].
3. The general public policy is also illustrated by federal and state
laws on truth in advertising, packaging and lending. See, e.g., Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1964); S. 823, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (a bill to enable consumers to protect them-
selves against arbitrary, erroneous, and malicious credit information);
MINN. STAT. § 325.905 (1967) (duty of county attorney to prosecute for
false advertising).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
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change Act of 1934.1 Rule lOb-5, 6 promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in accordance with section 10b 7
of the 1934 Act, has become a potent weapon to attack injustices
in the dissemination and use of securities information. One sig-
nificant malpractice at which Rule 10b-5 has been thrust is unfair
insider trading-the use of important, unpublicized corporate in-
formation as a basis for a decision to buy or sell the company's
stock or to make a recommendation to others to buy or sell.
The successful use of Rule 10b-5 by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in many recent actions, including those in-
volving Texas Gulf Sulphur Company 9 and Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith,10 has caused the business community
great concern. The reasons for the apprehension have been
both the increased readiness of the SEC to prevent the misuse
of inside information and the difficulty in determining what
type of conduct is unlawful and who may be liable for it. Nu-
merous speeches, discussions and writings have sought to delin-
eate what the new rulings mean for the corporate enterprise as
well as for corporate officials and employees, stockbrokers, se-
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967). See note 37 infra.
7. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-
directly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange:(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
8. Both the perversion of information and the perverted use of
virgin information can be violative of Rule 10b-5. The former is
illustrated by Escott v. BarChris Contr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (false and misleading information in registration statement and
prospectus) and SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969)(misrepresentations in connection with solicitation of proxies antecedent
to a merger), while the latter is illustrated by cases such as Ruckle v.
Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) (withholding from full board
latest financial statements and other facts by defendant directors) and
those in which one trades on inside informalion. In addition, Rule 10b-5
has been invoked in cases where corruption or misuse of information is
not the real issue. See, e.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp.
21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
9. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
See also text accompanying note 45 infra.
10. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Exch.
Act Rel. No. 34-8459 (Nov. 25, 1968). See also text accompanying note
48 infra.
[Vol. 54:147
RULE lob-5
curity analysts and others..' While the general effect of the re-
cent rulings on the securities market will be salutary, it is ironic
that the security analyst, whose primary role is to help assure
an informed market, is not only faced with kaleidoscopic liabil-
ities but is hampered in his quest for necessary information
from corporate officials.
This Note will first review the methods by which the secur-
ity analyst obtains corporate information, develops an invest-
ment recommendation and apprises the investor of his evalu-
ation. It will then trace the rapid development of securities
regulation, plot the potential 10b-5 insider trading liabilities
which a security analyst now faces in compiling and distributing
his recommendations and discuss particular difficulties which
may arise when the new rules are applied to the analyst. Fin-
ally, the Note will examine the "blackout" of corporate inform-
ation caused by uncertainties in the future application of the new
rules.
H. INFORMATION FLOW
Perhaps a majority of the 25 million shareholders in the
United States fancy themselves security analysts, obtaining in-
formation from general and financial periodicals, company re-
ports and news releases, friends and stockbrokers. The goal
of both the lay and professional analyst is to accurately predict
a company's prospects for profit in the form of dividends and
appreciation of the security's value. Unlike the average lay
analyst, however, the professional is usually prepared to utilize
every source of information and appraise every element necessary
to make an accurate analysis.12
11. The 1968 fall conference of the Financial Analysts Federation
featured several forums on corporate disclosure and use of insider
information, including one conducted by Philip A. Loomis, Jr., gen-
eral counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The confer-
ence was held in Atlanta from Oct. 6 to 9, 1968. The Practicing Law
Institute held similar forums in New York City beginning on Oct. 10,
1968, and in Las Vegas beginning on Nov. 7, 1968, as did the Continuing
Legal Education service of the University of Michigan Law School in
St. Louis on Jan. 16 and 17, 1969. See also W. PAINTER, FEDERAL
REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1968); A. BROmBERG, SECURITIEs LAw:
FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5 (1967) (with supplements).
12. A thorough analysis and sound conclusion is not, however,
characteristic of all research procedures and investment advice. The
time which is spent and the sources which are utilized on each analysis,
as well as the ability and training of the analyst, vary greatly. See
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 145-46, 334-71. B. GRAAmw, D. DODD &
S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYsIs: PRINcnALs Am TECHNIQUE 106-07(4th ed. 1962); Zitnik, Research Report Ethics, FINANcIAL ANALYSTS
J. 73 (Jan.-Feb. 1966). See also note 15 infra.
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These sources of information include government statistics,
trade journals, company financial statements,13 stockholder re-
ports, news releases and personal meetings with company of-
ficials. 14 The personal meeting may be either a management
presentation before the local society of analysts or a private dis-
cussion between a company official and an analyst.' 5 The pro-
fessional analyst, like the lay analyst, will also occasionally re-
The "customer's man" and supervisory personnel in a brokerage
firm and the firm itself are regulated by the SEC, but the brokerage
firm's security analyst is virtually untouched by such regulation. Al-
though those providing investment advice for a fee as defined by 15 U.S.C.
§ 806-2 (a) (11) (1964) must register with the SEC in accordance
with 15 U.S.C. § 806-3 (1964) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80b (1964), the advisory service analyst, like his counterpart
in a brokerage firm, is subject to no qualification standards upon enter-
ing the field. While most brokerage analysts hold college degrees,
counseling and advisory firm personnel are generally less highly edu-
cated. The SEC has proposed that qualification standards be estab-
lished for both groups. SPECIAL STUDY, stupra note 2, at 145-46, 159-62,
381-83.
13. Sources of financial information also include STANDARD & PooR's
CORPORATION RECORDS and MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MTANUAL. A less widely
used source is the annual 10-K report, and others, filed by companies
with the SEC. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 353-55.
14. See generally B. GRAHAM, D. DOrD & S. COTTLE, supra note 12,
at 77-84; The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1968, at 1, col. 6. Other sources
which are at times equally important include a company's suppliers and
competitors and also acquaintances in the firm itself, such as a duplicat-
ing machine operator. See The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1969, at 1,
col. 4.
15. As might be expected, evidence cf a certain amount of "crib-
bing"-the use of another's work to voice judgments ostensibly one's
own-has also been uncovered. This practice, probably disproportion-
ately common among unreliable investment advisory services, sometimes
approaches complete reliance upon another's conclusion. In such a case,
the source is not one of information for an analysis but is one of an
analysis itself. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 341-49.
"Cribbing" a conclusion is similar to, but upon ethical grounds dis-
tinguishable from, the prevalent "cross-use" of analyses. Often, a small
brokerage firm has a correspondent relationship with a larger brokerage
firm or with an advisory firm, whereby it receives advisory materials
for internal use or for distribution. Materials distributed to the small
firm's customers either carry its own heading or that of the original
distributor. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 355-56. Numerous
other "cross-use" relationships also exist, including use of outside ma-
terial by a mutual fund managing company or a bank trust department.
See note 22 infra; SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 356, 360. "Cross-
use" can usually be distinguished from "cribbing" upon one or both of
the following bases: (1) expected reliance of a small brokerage house
upon one well-equipped to do accurate analysis as against the implied
representation of a subscription publisher that its recommendations have
been researched by the firm itself; and (2) use of another's conclusion
to supplement one's own independent study as against complete reliance
upon another's conclusion.
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ceive a tip or hear a rumor about company developments. Ele-
ments of appraisal include any information that will affect
earnings, including data on the company's sales, costs, capital-
ization basis, cash condition, marketing organization, labor re-
lations, research and development, and managerial policy and
ability, as well as data on the industry and economy.16
An item of information received through one of the above
sources is occasionally of such importance that it has a value by
itself in recommending an immediate investment transaction.
Most of the information, however, is analyzed on the basis of
objective tests and subjective judgments and is assimilated into
a periodic report or a running account on the security's de-
sirability. Objective tests are performed on the book value per
share, ratios of liquidity and capitalization, and rates of return.
Subjective judgments are made on the strength and vitality
of the corporate managers, of the marketing and labor situ-
ations and of the industry. Thus the information received is
either of special import and made the basis of an immediate
recommendation or of general import and incorporated into
reports or running accounts.
The resulting use of both the completed analysis and the
item of special import depends upon the type of analyst re-
ceiving the information. The brokerage firm analyst uses matter
of general importance for intrafirm communications or for mar-
ket reports distributed by the company,17 or he incorporates it
into his running judgment to provide advice to the investors
seeking it.1s The items of special significance may be used to no-
tify special' 9 or selected2 ° customers, be used as a basis for a
16. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, supra note 12; Smith,
A Security Analyst Looks at Financial Statements, 108 J. or ACCOUNT-
ANcy 37 (Aug., 1959); Hayes, Accounting Principles and Investment
Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMavP. PROB. 752 (1965).
17. Intrafirm materials consist of recommendation lists sent out
by a large brokerage firm's research department to branch offices
for the use by the selling staff. Market reports include brief letters
with short analyses of many securities sent by a firm periodically or
irregularly to those on its mailing list. The mailing list often includes
potential as well as present customers. A report may also be a length-
ier study of a single company. Such reports are usually circulated only
among the larger "special" customers of a firm. The special customers
may also get other specially prepared reports.
18. An analyst's running judgment or running account will be used
as a basis for a later reanalysis and as a fund of information with
which to answer inquiries of a salesman. See SPECA.L STmY, supra
note 2, at 330-31, 345, 350-51.
19. Large customers of a brokerage firm or investment advisory
service might be termed "special" customers. Special customers, such
19691
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
transaction by the analyst or another member of his firm or be
made the subject of a general reporl;. 21 Analysts in companies
which manage mutual funds and bank trust departments, on the
other hand, do not prepare reports for public dissemination,
but rather use the information of both general and special im-
port for investment decisions within the firm or as a basis for
personal transactions.2 2 Analysts in an investment advisory
firm or investment counseling firm use both the general and
special information as a basis for newsletter recommendations,
for rapid notification of special customers 23 or for transactions
in firm or personal accounts.
as institutional investors, are often lucrative accounts and they generally
receive priority treatment with regard to research skill and advice.
SPE CIAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 357-58.
20. A practice common among some brokerage firms is to notify a
certain number of customers about a change in value outlook of a certain
security. The firm might have an alphabetical list and notify different
groupings of successive developments in various securities so that the
advice is spread among many customers. Such customers may be
termed "selected."
21. It is conceivable but improbable -that a brokerage firm would
decide to publish news of special significance in a market report before
making another use of it. The time lost would probably render the
news worthless.
22. In a large trust department, trading decisions are based upon
studies by the department analysts themselves and upon information
and advice provided by the research department of a brokerage firm
and by other outside sources. The medium and small-sized trust de-
partments rely largely on outside sources. The "correspondent" analyst,
who is often the brokerage analyst, meets personally with the bank
analyst and keeps him informed of new developments by phone. News
of recent developments often reaches the bank analyst first since each
salesman in a brokerage firm's "institutiona" department handles fewer
customers than the salesman in the "retail" department. Developments
which are publicly disseminated, such as a new earnings report, reach
the bank directly and are not the subject of a brokerage house-bank
communication. The brokerage house is paid for its information and
advice in the form of commissions on the resulting stock transactions.
Payment to independent advisory and counseling firms is by direct fee
since such firms are not brokers. Interview with John B. Bryngelson,
Vice President, Trust Department, First National Bank of Minneapolis,
in Minneapolis, Minn., Feb. 20, 1969.
23. Many investment advisory services publish subscription news-
letters which provide advice on which stocks to buy, and, on occasion,
which to sell. Examples are the Dow Theory Forecast, Standard & Poor's
Outlook and Babson's Reports. Some advisory services offer a "con-
sultation privilege" which provides answers to subscribers' inquir-
ies and a few offer personal portfolio recommendations. See SPECIAL
STUDY, supra note 2, at 331, 334-44, 360-62.
An investment counseling firm, on the other hand, provides tailored
advice on a fee basis to customers with mirnimum investment assets of
$50,000 to $100,000, or to large investing concerns such as a mutual
fund, bank trust department or life insurance company. The securities
[Vol. 54:147
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HI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES REGULATION
A. CommON LAw
The practice of trading on inside information is largely a
development of the last 80 years. Only in an era of cor-
porate ownership by remote nonmanaging shareholders could
such a practice have an opportunity to flourish. While early
courts uniformly imposed liability upon an insider for making
affirmative misrepresentations when buying or selling stock,24
they developed divergent rules for insiders who merely failed
to disclose important information to the other party. The rule
which obtained initial majority acceptance viewed the transac-
tion as one at "arm's length" and therefore imposed no duty
upon the corporate official to disclose confidential information.25
A rule born of a different judicial philosophy placed a "fidu-
ciary duty" on the corporate official to disclose important in-
formation when dealing in stock transactions with the com-
pany's shareholders. 6 The rule which occupied the middle
ground-the "special facts" or "special circumstances" doctrine2r
research is done by a separate department, and not by the counselor.
While the sole concern of many advisory firms is investment counsel-
ing, some subscription services and some brokerage firms also "coun-
sel" See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 369-70.
24. See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S.
410, 425 (1941). See also 3 RESTATEVIENT Or TORTS § 529 (1938); W.
PROSSER, TORTS 534 (2d ed. 1955).
25. E.g., Gladstone v. Murray Co., 314 Mass. 584, 50 N.E.2d 958
(1943); Connolly v. Shannon, 105 N.J. Eq. 155, 147 A. 234 (1929), aff'd,
107 N.J. Eq. 180, 151 A. 905 (1930); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581
(N.Y. 1868). The arm's length rule is based on the theory that "neither
party owes to the other any higher standard of fairness than is applicable
in the market place to an ordinary purchase or sale of a chattel." A.
FREY, C. MORRIS & J. CHOPER, CASES AD MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
683 (1966). In reviewing early cases on insider trading, an early com-
mentator stated that for a director to
take advantage of his position to secure the profits that all
have won, offends the moral sense; no shareholder expects
to be so treated by the director he selects; no director would
urge his friends to select him for that reason; that the law
yet allows him to do this, does more to discourage legitimate
investment in corporate shares than almost anything else...
Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Share-
holder, 8 MIcH. L. REv. 267, 297 (1910). But see H. IMANNE, INsDER
TRADING AND =un STocK MARKET (1966), where it is argued that use of in-
side information benefits the stock market and the corporate employer.
26. E.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Hotchkiss
v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28
N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct., New York County, 1941).
27. E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). See H. BALLAX-
TINE, CORPORATIONS 213 (rev. ed. 1946); 3 L. Loss, SEcumrIEs REGULATION
1446-47 (2d ed. 1961).
1969]
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-imposed the fiduciary obligation when justified by the exist-
ence of special facts or circumstances.2 8
The "special circumstances" rule has apparently attained
the status of the majority rule today.29 Although this represents
a significant shift in policy from the older rule, it does not pro-
vide all-weather protection for the investor. Since the insider
owes a fiduciary duty only to a shareholder, a purchaser is not
protected, since he is not a shareholder until the sale is com-
pleted. 0 Furthermore, it is unlikely that a shareholder selling
on a stock exchange is encompassed within either rule.31 Thus,
the great majority of today's stock transactions are covered by
neither the most prevalent nor the most liberal common law
rule.
B. FEDERAL SEcURiTIEs REGULATION TO :1960
Confronted with a constituency which traded increasingly
in corporate securities and beset by an economy whose failures
were painfully illustrated by the stock market crash of 1929,
Congress passed far-reaching regulatory laws in 1933 and
1934. 32 While insider trading on the basis of undisclosed infor-
mation may well have been a prime concern of Congress, 8 it was
28. In Strong v. Repide, the general manager (and controlling
shareholder) of a firm owning land in the Philippines employed a straw
man to purchase the plaintiff's shares. The plaintiff was not aware of
the imminent and favorable sale of the lands to the U.S. Government.
In upholding the plaintiff's claim of fraud, the Court said that,
[i]t is here sought to make defendant responsible for his ac-
tions not alone and simply in his character as a director,
but because, in consideration of all the existing circumstances
. it became the duty of the defendant ... to state the
facts before making the purchase.
213 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
29. 3 L. Loss, supra note 27, at 1447.
30. Id.
31. Most cases have involved face-to-face dealing and no plaintiff
selling on a stock exchange has prevailed. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283
Mass. 358, 362, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933); 3 L. Loss, supra note 27, at
1454-55; H. AANE, supra note 25, at 22.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d CoNG., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73 Cong., 2d
Sess. 55, 68 (1934).
33. Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hear-
ings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of
their fiduciary duty by directors and officers of corporations
who used their positions of trust and the confidential in-
formation which came to them in such positions, to aid them
in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of
abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information
by large stockholders who, while not directors and officers,
exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their corn-
[Vol. 54:147
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clearly not a prime target of the laws as enacted. The Secur-
ities Act of 1933 was aimed at reducing the initial distribution
of unworthy securities by requiring the disclosure of extensive
information on the corporation's affairs in general and the pro-
posed issue in particular.3 4 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
sought to prevent unfair trading practices subsequent to dis-
tribution by setting controls on the securities markets 5 and
by providing, in section 16b, that profits made by officers, di-
rectors and 10 percent owners on shortswing transactions could
be recovered by the corporation.3 6 However, this provision
left unregulated many insider trading practices and a broad
anti-fraud provision-section 10b-was fated to fill the chasm.
With the declaration of Rule 10b-5 by the SEC in 1942, the
versatility of section 10b was recognized and a new chapter
in federal corporation law was titled; nevertheless, the script
remained largely unwritten until the 1960's.
Rule 10b-5 as promulgated provided in part that no person
shall, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, use
a national securities exchange or any instrumentality of inter-
state commerce to engage in an act, practice or course of
business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 7
The Rule received its most significant early interpretation when
panies to enable them to acquire and profit by information
not available to others.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-j (1964). See generally L. Loss, supra note 27;
H. BALLANTINE, supra note 27; N. LATrIm, CoRpoRATroNs (1959); Douglas
& Bates, Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964). A shortswing transaction is one in
which the 16b insider purchases and sells or sells and repurchases a
security within six months.
37. Rule lOb-5 provides in full that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity.
IF-C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
The original purpose of Rule lOb-5 was to prevent frauds by pur-
chasers since such frauds were not covered by Section 17 of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933. See SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
19691
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a federal court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Company8 s held
that an individual could recover damages resulting from a vio-
lation of the Rule. Up to 1960, however, the Kardon holding did
not encompass any policy against most insider trading because
Rule 10b-5 was not thought to make unlawful any conduct be-
yond that proscribed by the common law "special circumstances"
rule. 9
C. THE REcENT SURGE
In 1961, the Securities and Exchange Commission broke new
ground for what proved to be a business arena filled with in-
sider trading liabilities. In re Cady, Roberts & Company,40
decided by the SEC, delineated in several respects the bounds of
Rule 10b-5.41 In that case, a corporate director notified a broker
of a dividend decrease just voted by the board of directors. The
broker then sold shares for discretionary accounts before the
news had been disclosed over the Dow Jones broad tape. In
sanctioning the conduct of the broker with a fine and suspension,
the SEC held that the obligation to disclose inside information
38. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Ever since Kardon, it has
generally been held that a civil remedy is available to buyers and sellers.
See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., "380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967);
McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). See also J.L Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Commentators, however, have argued
that the Congressional omission of a privat.e right of action was deliber-
rate. See, e.g., Ruder, Civil Liability Un:der Rule 10b-5: Judicial Re-
vision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 635 (1963); Note,
Civil Liability Under Rule X-Ob-5, 42 V.. L. REV. 537, 545 (1956).
39. It has long been disputed whether Rule lOb-5 created any-
thing more than federal supervision of the special circumstances doctrine
or made unlawful anything other than common law fraud. Thus, it has
been held that a fiduciary relationship is necessary for nondisclosure of
a material fact to be actionable, Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964), and each common law element has
been held to be necessary to a plaintiffs cause of action. Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F.
Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Other courts have found, however, that the
scope of 10b-5 is not limited by the common law standards of fraud.
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Berko v. SEC, 316
F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
The latter position is that of the SEC. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 913-14 (1961) (dictum).
40. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
41. The SEC and the court decisions have generally relied on sub-
section (3), see text accompanying note 37 supra, of Rule 10b-5 when
imposing the duty of disclosure. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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imposed by Rule 10b-5 42 is not limited to those traditionally de-
fined as insiders. The Commission further declared that the
obligation is imposed where one trades over a stock exchange as
well as where he trades in person43 and that it protects a pur-
chasing investor as well as a selling shareholder.44
The second major case of the decade, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,45 has had a much greater in terrorem effect and has
thus overshadowed Cady, Roberts.4 6 An initial drilling for min-
erals by Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) indicated that the land
had tremendous mineral potential. Drilling was discontinued
for four months while the company purchased surrounding
land. During this period, and also after substantiation of
the early results had been made by additional drilling, numer-
ous directors, officers and employees personally acquired stock
and stock options, and either divulged the information or simply
recommended the stock to outsiders. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that all but one of the defendants vio-
lated Rule 10b-5 by misusing inside information. In reversing
the district court, the Second Circuit rejected the lower court's
finding that the information was not material. The test of ma-
teriality, said the court of appeals, is whether a reasonable
42. Early court decisions held that Rule lOb-5 imposes a duty
upon "insiders" to disclose inside information when dealing personally
with shareholders. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,
828-29 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp.
798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
43. It would be anomalous indeed if the protection afforded
by the anti-fraud provisions were withdrawn from transactions
effected on exchanges, primary markets for securities trans-
actions. If purchasers on an exchange had available material
information known by a selling insider, we may assume that
their investment judgment would be affected and their de-
cision whether to buy might accordingly be modified.
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 (1961). The Commission
then footnoted a statement saying that the Exchange Act was intended
to remedy abuses in the exchange markets. Id. at 914 n.25.
44. The registrant in Cady, Roberts cited Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136
Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932) to support its contention that insiders owe
a fiduciary duty only to sellers. The Commission rejected the argu-
ment, noting that the title of Rule 10b-5 presently reads "Employment
of manipulative and deceptive practices," the words "by a purchaser"
having been struck in 16 Fed. Reg. 7928 (1951). The Commission also
relied on Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d
46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951), stating that no valid
reason exists for distinguishing buyers from sellers. In re Cady, Rob-
erts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913-14 (1961). See also note 37 supra.
45. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
46. See text accompanying notes 107 & 108 infra.
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man would attach importance to the fact in making an invest-
ment decision.4
Soon after the decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC
brought a 10b-5 action against the brokerage firm of Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith; numerous of its employees,
and 15 large mutual fund customers.4  The Commission
charged that the firm's underwriting department received in-
formation about an earnings drop and a downward revision of
the earnings projection from Douglas Aircraft, and that employ-
ees in the securities research department and other departments
passed the non-public information to the firm's institutional
customers. The brokerage firm agreed to a settlement, which
included the censure and suspension of several employees and
the temporary closing of two offices.49
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE EXPANDED SCOPE OF
10b-5 ON SECURITY ANALYSTS
A. POTENTIAL LIABILIEs
1. The Analyst's Vulnerability
The threshold question which arises when examining the
security analyst's potential liability under 10b-5 is whether the
analyst is within the ambit of the Rule. Until recently, it was
argued that the Rule applies only to the traditional insider, such
as the corporate director or officer and the large shareholder.
The reasoning was that since the common law rule against in-
sider trading and the shortswing profit-taking rule of Section
16b 50 apply only to these persons5' and since Rule 10b-5 contains
only general anti-fraud language without any mention of trad-
ing on inside information, any incorporation of an insider trad-
47. The second significant aspect of the decision was the pro-
nouncement that Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. itself may have violated Rule
10b-5 by issuing a possibly misleading press release prior to confirm-
ing the rumors of a major ore strike. The issue of whether the news
report was misleading was remanded to the trial court for determination.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968).
48. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, SEC Exch. Act
Rel. No. 34-8459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
49. Similar actions have also been brought against other brokerage
firms. See, e.g., In re Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., SEC Exch. Act Rel. No.
8511 (Jan. 31, 1969); In re Blythe & Co. & Briggs, SEC Exch. Act Rel.
No. 8499 (Jan. 17, 1969).
50. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
51. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 27, at 1446.
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ing rule into 10b-5 should extend only to the traditional in-
sider . 2
This narrow interpretation of the Rule was rejected in
Cady, Roberts, which declared that Rule 10b-5 prohibits the un-
lawful conduct of "anyone" and stated that 10b-5 insidership has
as its basis:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing.53
The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur agreed with the SEC's reading
of the Rule, adding that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or . . . abstain from trading
in or recommending the securities .... 54
It is thus apparent that outsiders as well as insiders are within
the grasp of Rule 10b-5, and that the traditional "rule against
52. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
54. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968). Thus, an analyst's argument that he did not profit from the
news but only used it as a basis for recommendation to others will be
unavailing. In fact, two defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur were found
to have violated lOb-5 for tipping off others. See also In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (broker's sales for others found to
be a violation); Comment, 14 VULL. L. REv. 140, 147-48 (1968). Failure
to fulfill the "access test" of Cady, Roberts, however, would not neces-
sarily preclude one's being in violation of lob-5. While the Cady,
Roberts, doctrine requires the "existence of a relationship giving access
... to information," which the Texas Gulf Sulphur court purportedly
adopted, the latter court also declared that "anyone" having inside in-
formation is encompassed.
Persons receiving information from an insider-the "tippee"-have,
however, often escaped prosecution. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), where the SEC made defendants of
none of the six tippees. Nevertheless, the court noted that use of ma-
terial information by a tippee with actual or constructive knowledge
that it is undisclosed might be as "reprehensible" as use by an insider.
Id. at 853. See also Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
where three dentists were tipped off by corporate directors and were
held to a duty to disclose. The dentists were, however, familiar with
corporate activities and thus the court reasoned that they could prob-
ably be termed insiders. In any event, added the court, a tippee who
as a "knowing confederate" acts on inside information is liable for aiding
and abetting a Rule lOb-5 violation.
The fact that both the Ross dentists and the Merrill Lynch investors
were easily identifiable, were certain of the validity of the information
and were in a somewhat closer relationship to the inside source than
the traditional "man on the street" tippee seems to offer a distinction
with a real difference.
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insider trading" has actually become a rule against insider and
outsider trading on inside information.55
That Rule 10b-5 will in fact be applied to persons outside
the class of the traditional insider is illustrated by the fact that
the nonmanaging corporate employee, the stockbroker and mem-
bers of a brokerage firm's research department have recently
been charged with violations of the Rule.56 Morever, the most
obvious circumstance under which a security analyst would
violate the Rule-the misuse of information received in a
personal meeting with a company official-falls within the
scope of both the Cady, Roberts and the Texas Gulf Sulphur
holdings, as noted above. To shield an analyst from liability
under Rule 10b-5 would be inconsistent not only with the tech-
nical holdings of the case law but also with the purpose57 un-
derlying the broad prohibition against insider trading.58 There-
55. Alternatively, the outsider having inside information could be
termed an insider. Rule 10b-5 is applicable to "anyone," however, and
such a perversion is unnecessary and would only serve to complicate an
analysis of the emerging rules.
56. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)
(corporate director, officers, and employees); In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-8459 (Nov. 25,
1968) (member of brokerage firm's research department); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (stockbroker).
In addition, the SEC has brought action against 10 institutional
investors who received information of Douglas Aircraft's earnings drop
from Merrill Lynch employees. See CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 77,596.
57. See notes 69 & 70 infra, and accompanying text.
58. Of additional importance in analyzing the security analyst's
vulnerability to Rule 10b-5 is the question of general procedural and
substantive obstructions for the plaintiff. Items of a procedural nature
include federal court jurisdiction, venue, and service of process. Sub-
stantive elements of a plaintiff's cause of action for common law fraud
are misrepresentation, materiality, scienter and reliance. Because the
common law on insider trading has to some extent been engrafted into
10b-5, whether the common law elements are a prerequisite to a 10b-5
cause of action has been a subject of dispute. See text accompanying
note 54 supra. Since mere nondisclosure has become actionable under
10b-5 as well as under the common law majority rule, an affirmative
misrepresentation is presently not required for either action. Material-
ity, of course, remains an important requirement. Scienter is no longer
required for conduct to constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5. In its
place is an element variously termed "lack of diligence, constructive
fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct .... ." SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968). Whether an intent to
defraud will be necessary in a damage action has apparently been an-
swered in the negative. Id. at 854-56. Reliance is also of decreasing
validity in modern 10b-5 actions. See Sommer, Rule l0b-5: Notes
for Legislation, 17 W. REs. L. REV. 1029, 1043 (1966).
An additional obstacle which might possibly confront a plaintiff in
a private action is privity. It probably will not be held to be a require-
ment since it would likely defeat the action, due to failure of proof, of
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fore, it clearly appears that the security analyst is within the
purview of Rule lob-5.
2. What Constitutes Unlawful Conduct
Although the cloud of Rule 10b-5 liability is beginning to
settle over a diverse group of persons, including the security
analyst, the specific type of conduct made unlawful is largely
undetermined. However, one well-established hurdle which
must be negotiated by every plaintiff in a 10b-5 action is that of
proving the materiality of the information allegedly misused.
An item of information is material for Rule lOb-5 purposes if a
reasonable man would attach importance to it in determining his
choice of action,"0 and therefore, facts which under reasonable
and objective contemplation might affect the value of the stock
meet the materiality requirements of the Rule.6 0
While the bounds of the definition have not yet been clearly
all plaintiffs doing business over a stock exchange. See generally
Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REV.
171, 181-82 (1964).
59. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965); RE-
STATEMNT o TORTS § 538 (2) (a) (1938).
60. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965); Koher
v. Kohier Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963). The Texas Gulf Sulphur
opinion lends support to two conflicting definitions of materiality: The
definitions quoted in the text, and one professing that the duty to dis-
close or abstain from trading arises only in "those situations which are
essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain to
have a substantial effect on the market price of the security if disclosed."
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), citing
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271,
1289 (1965) (emphasis added). The definitions in the text accompany-
ing this note and note 59 supra, however, appear to be given somewhat
more weight. If these definitions become permanently established, then
the court would indeed seem to have set a "very low threshold of
materiality." Bromberg, Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 1 Tim REv.
oF SEcurrs REGULATION 985 (1968). Bromberg suggests that the
courts might adopt as a rule of thumb a certain percentage change in
probable effect of market value as the standard for materiality. Id.
Former Securities and Exchange Commissioner Francis M. Wheat
suggested, prior to the Court of Appeals decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
that the facts be of "such a nature that their disclosure could reasonably
be expected to have a substantial impact on the market .... " Fleis-
cher, Corporate Disclosure/Insider Trading, 45 HARv. Bus. REv. 129, 130
(Jan.-Feb., 1967). Materiality has also been defined as "[m]atters
which such an investor needs to know before he can make an intelligent,
informed decision whether or not to buy the security." Escott v. Bar-
Chris Contr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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enunciated because the cases to date have involved information
of extraordinary value, general lines can be drawn by reviewing
court decisions and writers' suggestions. Courts have found
"material" information regarding a stock split,6' merger, 2 an
impending liquidation of an appreciated inventory63 and an im-
pending sale of corporate assets.64 Commentators have added
to this list information of an important product discovery, a
proposed liquidation and the winning of a major contract.65
Applying the test of materiality involves a balancing of two
factors: magnitude and probability. A determination of the
magnitude requires both an estimate of the absolute size of the
development and a consideration of the effect of the develop-
ment "in light of the totality of the company activity."66 For
example, the winning of a $10 million government contract
would not have the same impact on General Dynamics as it
would on a smaller company. A determination of the probability
requires a prediction of the likelihood that the event will occur.
Further analysis of the conduct prohibited by the Rule neces-
sitates a retreat of one step. An issue which will be relevant in
some cases and which analytically requires a determination
prior to the issue of materiality is -whether fragments of in-
formation, which become material orly upon an evaluation of
the aggregate, can constitute the "material inside information"
whose misuse is prohibited. In the cases heretofore considered,
the specific information received was that an important event
either had occurred or was likely to occur. Since a unity of
material information and event existed, no synthesis was re-
quired for the defendant to utilize the information. Thus, appli-
cation of the inside information rule was inescapable.
Cases will undoubtedly arise, however, in which a unity of
material information and event does not exist. Even a bare
apprehension of an event might be recognizable only through a
synthesis of fragmented information. Furthermore, one case
may involve fragments received exclusively from insiders while
61. See Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.
1965).
62. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 246 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
63. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
64. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
65. Farmer, Cary, Fleischer & Hallerar4 Insider Trading in Stocks,
21 Bus. LAw. 1009 (1966).
66. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968).
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another involves fragments received from both inside and out-
side sources.67
Consequently, both unity and nonunity cases involve a de-
termination of materiality, while the nonunity (synthesis) cases
also require an initial determination of whether the insider trad-
ing rule is applicable. In establishing a framework of liability,
it will be helpful to hypothesize several situations based on
variations of the Texas Gulf Sulphur case.
(a) Unity & Outside Source
A security analyst may hear news of a corporate develop-
ment from an outside source. For example, news of the TGS ore
strike may have been first obtained by an analyst through a
company press release. Acting 8 on the basis of this information
is clearly lawful, since the information is public. There is no
"overreaching" by one in possession of undisclosed information69
and "equal access" to information is preserved.70
67. Of course, persons other than the security analyst are also
likely to possess fragments of information, the synthesis of which may
lead to a realization of a corporate event. These persons include the
journalist, the corporate officer, director, employees and their friends.
The analyst, however, is in the midst of a stream continually flowing
with corporate data and thus he is especially likely to confront such a
question.
68. "Act" as used in this Note means any method by which ma-
terial inside information can be misused. While insiders usually act by
trading for themselves, analysts usually act by recommending the secur-
ity to others. The brokerage analyst's recommendation usually reaches
the customer through a market report or customer's man; the investment
advisory analyst's recommendations are funnelled through the service's
publication, and the trust department and mutual fund analyst's recom-
mendations are provided to the "customer" in the person of an invest-
ment committee. Using material inside information either to trade for
one's own account or for recommending it to others is clearly a violation
of Rule lOb-5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968); In re Cady, Roberts Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-8459 (Nov.
25, 1968). Attempting to fulfill the duty to disclose by releasing a
market report would probably in itself be insufficient because of the
small circulation and resulting limited effectiveness.
69. The crux of the theory behind many securities laws provisionis
found in the statement that "Itlhe essential objective . . . is to proteot
those who do not know market conditions from the overreachings of
those who do." Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 4a4 437
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
70. "The core of Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congres-
sional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards
of participation in securities transactions. It was the intent of CQnlgreas
that all members of the investing public should be subiect to-identical
market risks.... Such inequities based upon unequal access to knowl-
edge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of life, or, m
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(b) Unity & Inside Source
An analyst may hear news of a corporate development from
an inside source. For example, an analyst may have first heard
about the TGS ore strike from a company official. If the analyst
acts on this statement prior to public disclosure,7 1 he violates
Rule 10b-5. The result is the same as if an insider tips off an
outside acquaintance,72 since in both situations, the investing
public is relegated to an inferior level of access to informa-
tion. The analyst and those whom he notifies should not be
allowed to profit from the analyst's special relationship with
an inside tipper. Similarly, the analyst can be expected to
recognize the materiality of the information and realize that
trading based thereon would violate the Rule.73
(c) Nonunity & Outside Source
An analyst may, by the use of sources of information open
to the public, perceive the existence of a significant corporate
development. For example, he may have thought that TGS had
made a significant strike on the basis of the following hypothetical
items: a recent annual report of the company stating that the
budget for Canadian explorations had been doubled; a news re-
port stating that TGS chartered a plane to deliver cores to the
U.S. for assaying; another news report revealing that three top
company officials visited Timmins, Ontario, and a rumor along
view of the congressional concern in the area, remain uncorrected."
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-2 (2d Cir. 1968).
71. Since trading must await "effective" disclosure, a problem
common to all in possession of inside information concerns the
length of time after disclosure during which action is prohibited. See
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968).
72. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, SEC Exch. Act Rel.
No. 34-8459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
73. One factor of importance in any insider trading suit is the
"state of mind" of the defendant. Scienter was a requirement in the
traditional insider trading case. This common law requirement has been
modified, however, so that mere negligent conduct is all that is required.
See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Negligent analyst conduct seems to be
clearly present in the instant hypothetical discussed in the text and in
the subsequent hypotheticals which suggest that certain conduct is pro-
scribed by the Rule. Although conduct more grievous than negligence
may be required in a damage suit against a non-profiting corporation
for a misleading press release, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d at 866 (2d Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion), the case of the analyst-
defendant seems to be different since the analyst benefits, although
indirectly, from his recommendations.
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Wall Street that TGS is hurriedly purchasing land near Tim-
mins.7 4
It cannot be seriously contended that it is unlawful to act on
the basis of an evaluation of this information. As in the case
where an analyst hears news of an important corporate event
through a company news release, these fragments of information
do not constitute inside information. In both situations, all in-
terested investors have relatively 75 equal access to the items, and
the law does not invalidate a transaction because one party
neglected to evaluate the bargain.76 This justification derives
from the "personal expertise doctrine," which states that one
may trade on the dictates of an investment judgment based on
one's analytical ability or superior guesswork. The only limi-
tation is that "material inside information" not be used in formu-
lating the judgment.7
(d) Nonunity & Inside Source
A synthesis of items of information received during an in-
74. A "rumor" must be distinguished from a leak of news which
the analyst can define as coming from an inside source.
75. Rule lOb-5 is based "on the justifiable expectation of the secur-
ities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
have relatively equal access to material information ... " SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
76. Thus, it is apparent that the field of potential liability can be
narrowed on the receipt side of information flow: the analyst's use
of information already public, such as stockholder reports, public fi-
nancial statements, and news releases is not tinged with impropriety.
Discussion of unpublicized data with a corporate official in a private
meeting or at a presentation before an analysts' society is a case, how-
ever, where potential liability cannot automatically be narrowed. Even
if the meeting is open to journalists, the executives probably have a duty
to make sure that any important information is effectively publicized.
Use of material information not effectively publicized would probably be
a violation of Rule 10b-5.
77. Nor is an insider obligated to confer upon outside in-
vestors the benefit of his superior financial or other expert
analysis by disclosing his educated guesses or predictions....
The only regulatory objective is that access to material in-
formation be enjoyed equally, but this objective requires
nothing more than the disclosure of basic facts so that out-
siders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise in
reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal
to that of the insiders.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968).
"[P]erceptive analysis of generally known facts" is not unlawful. In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961). "The duty of disclosure
stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing
his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stock-
holders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.
1951) (emphasis added).
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terview with a corporate official may lead an analyst to believe
that there has been or is likely to be an important corporate
development. For example, a company official may have told
an analyst over the course of a three hour interview that he had
just visited Tinmmins, that the Canadian exploration budget had
been doubled, that a plane had been chartered to deliver cores
and that the company was purchasing land near Timmins. Other
developments which an analyst might perceive from fragments
obtained in this manner include a merger and a significant change
in sales or earnings.
Since the insider did not make an outright statement that
an event has occurred or that one was likely to occur, assuming
that the corporate event is material, the question reduces to
whether the Rule applies to an analyst who synthesizes the in-
side items and acts on the basis of his conclusion. It might be
argued that the items received were not in themselves material
and that, therefore, personal expertise was the catalyst causing
the analyst to act. However, present law states that informa-
tion which would be of importance to a reasonable investor in
deciding on a course of action is material. While this standard
was formulated in cases involving a single item of news and not
several, it would seem to be well adapted to handle both situ-
ations. Thus several items, taken together, could constitute
material inside information, 78 and if a reasonable investor would
find the items important in making an investment decision, the
analyst would be liable.7 9
The conclusion that this is the proper course of develop-
ment for the Rule is buttressed by the fact that it advances the
underlying purpose of Rule 10b-5, that being to preserve equal
access to important corporate news so that all investors share a
like bargaining position. Furthermore, such a ruling would not
cause in terrorem withdrawal from the investment recommend-
78. Information received from a company official during a presen-
tation before a group of analysts might also constitute material inside
information. Although these meetings are now generally open to jour-
nalists, it would seem that the company official is nevertheless under a
duty to "effectively" disseminate any important, nonpublic information
given, while the analyst is under a duty not to act on such news until
dissemination. One solution would be for the company official to issue
a news release prior to the meeting backgrounding news items on the
agenda.
79. In these situations, the test of materiality not only involves a
balancing of the "traditional" elements of magnitude and probability
that the event will occur, but also assumes a third element: probability
that one's deduction that an event has or is likely to occur is correct.
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ation business, since the analyst should certainly be able to
ascertain when he has made a conclusion based on information
received entirely from a discussion with a corporate insider. He
can then simply refrain from acting on that conclusion. In addi-
tion, since the analyst is an experienced evaluator of corporate
information, he would seemingly be better able to detect an
impending breakthrough than the "reasonable investor," and
thus escape liability.80
(e) Nonunity & Several Inside Sources
An analyst may also perceive the likelihood of a corporate
development from items received in interviews with several
insiders. For example, an analyst may have apprehended the
possibility of the TGS strike on the basis of the items mentioned
in the previous hypothetical after talking with several members
of the company management, each of whom mentions a separate
fact. The fact that there is a different number of insiders con-
tributing to the analyst's aggregate of information, however,
does not seem to warrant a different rule of law. More than one
source makes the materiality test no more difficult to apply.8 1
Similarly, the investing public would be denied equal access to
important information, just as if only one source were used.
Moreover, the analyst should be equally able to recognize this
situation and its inherent danger signals and thus refrain
from acting on the basis of his conclusion.
An ancillary question is whether the insiders in the mul-
tiple source situation are liable for their conduct. Since no in-
sider alone provided material information, it could be argued
that none would be individually liable. However, since the cor-
poration's agents in the above hypothetical did as a group dis-
close material information, an investor could convincingly argue
that the corporation is a "person" within the meaning of Rule
10b-5 and is thus liable. Hence, a corporation would be under a
strong compulsion to tighten up corporate procedure for dis-
cussion with analysts, journalists and others.8 2
80. The expense and anguish of a lawsuit may, however, counter-
balance the consolation of escaping liability. Besides, "acting" might
establish a presumption of misconduct. See note 89 infra.
81. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
82. For example, General Mills, Inc., not only provides all officials
with written guidelines for use in determining what matters may
appropriately be discussed with analysts, but usually one official familiar
with disclosure problems accompanies the analyst for the duration of
his visit to the company. Interview with Henry H. Porter, Jr., Vice
President and Treasurer, General Mills, Inc., in Minneapolis, Minn., Feb.
4, 1969.
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(f) Nonunity & Both Inside and Outside Sources
An analyst may perceive a corporate development by syn-
thesizing items received from both inside and outside sources.
For example, an analyst may have apprehended the existence of
the TGS strike only after obtaining information from newspapers
that TGS was purchasing land near Timmins and that the com-
pany had just chartered a plane for delivery of cores, and in-
formation from insiders that top company officials had made an
unprecedented trip to Timmins and that the budget had been
revised to adjust for expanded Canadian exploration. This situ-
ation differs from the previous two only in the respect that
some of the items necessary for the perception are received
from outside sources.
A first glance analysis is likely to suggest that since the in-
side information is not by itself material after synthesis, the
Rule is not applicable. Such a position, however, is not tenable
since if the reasonable investor can be assumed to know the out-
side items, inside items may be rendered material if a reason-
able investor is capable of synthesizing them. It would seem
appropriate to endow the reasonable investor with knowledge of
outside items which a shareholder or prospective shareholder
who follows the company's fortunes would probably know. Such
an application of the Rule would, at any rate, be consistent with
the purpose of the securities laws and would not be inequitable
to the interests involved s.8
In almost every case of synthesis involving inside facts, some
outside facts will be indispensable to a finding of materiality.
These outside facts include the condition of the economy and
industry, the size of the company, the ability of management
to take advantage of the development and the role of consumer
demand and influence, as well as items more closely related to
the development itself, such as the outside items obtained in the
instant hypothetical. Thus, to hold that there is materiality
only when the inside items by themselves are material would
be to declare the Rule impotent.
Of course, there is a danger that this framework of liability
would discriminate against the securi'y analyst. The analyst,
as guarantor of an informed market, constantly makes reports
and provides oral advice. His evaluations are based on an
83. The purpose is to guarantee equal access to inside information
and the interests involved are the protecticn of investors and assuring
the free flow of investment advice.
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analysis of a large amount of information, a substantial part
of which may be from inside sources. If a prima facie case of
liability were established every time an analyst perceived a ma-
terial development while having possession of some inside items,
his work would indeed be perilous. The risk is increased con-
siderably by the fact that his conduct under these circumstances
would be subjected to the hindsight of courts after the major
development had occurred. A logical solution would be for
courts to define "inside items" in such a way as to protect
analysts if the material development could be perceived by the
"reasonable investor" on the basis of exclusively outside facts.
This would seem reasonable since any inside fact leading to the
same conclusion as that obtained from items available to the
public cannot be said to be material.
Therefore, misuse of an inside item which is a minor but
integral element of the synthesis process would result in liabil-
ity to the analyst; at the same time, however, the rule would
work to the advantage of the analyst since if a reasonable inves-
tor could synthesize the outside facts he is presumed to know
and thereby reach the same conclusion as the analyst, the
analyst would not be liable under Rule 10b-5.
Finally, when applying the insider trading rule to the secur-
ity analyst, courts should be willing to avail themselves of the
inherent flexibility of the materiality test so as to advance both
the public's interest in equal access to information and its coun-
terbalancing interest in obtaining accurate and complete mar-
ket evaluations.
3. Particular Difficulties in Applying the New Rules
to the Security Analyst
Rule 10b-5 insider trading suits have heretofore generally
involved a defendant who obtained inside information and traded
on the basis thereof. However, new problems and considerations
will face the parties and the courts when a security analyst is
sued. The questions presented are likely to include: (a) Who
will sue the analyst for an infraction of Rule lOb-5? (b) How
will the plaintiff become aware of the analyst's infraction? (c)
How will it be determined whether the analyst's recommen-
dations were based on inside information? (d) How will it be
determined whether the information was material? (e) What
is the proper conduct for an analyst who possesses material in-
side information? (f) What remedies are available for use
against the defendant analyst?
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(a) Potential plaintiffs
The most prominent plaintiff in the landmark 10b-5 cases
has been the Securities and Exchange Commission,8 4 but a cause
of action for a violation of 10b-5 also extends to individual plain-
tiffs.8 5 The most obvious individual plaintiff is the investor who
purchases from or sells to either the profiting defendant or, in
the instant situation, to the profiting investor who trades on
the defendant analyst's advice. However, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to match the buyer with the seller in a securities
exchange transaction. Furthermore, the advisability of award-
ing damages solely to such a plaintiff has been questioned. 86
While it would seem fairer to split the damages between all plain-
tiff investors who were defrauded, this solution might encourage
scores of investors to sue on the basis of one violation and would
require a time-consuming determination by the court of who is
entitled to share the award. Awarding the damages to the
corporation itself8 7 would appear to be as practical a solution
for the situation where the analyst misuses undisclosed infor-
mation as where the insider misuses it.
(b) Locating misconduct
Locating instances of analyst misconduct will be at least as
difficult as spotting violations by insiders. Perhaps the best
method is to investigate unusual activity in a company's stock,
especially if the flurry of transactions is followed by disclosure
of an important corporate event. The stock exchanges and the
SEC do, at the present time, investigate such occurences and
can identify the parties involved in predisclosure transactions.8 8
84. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968);
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
85. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
86. It is hardly rational that on a day when a hundred
thousand shares of a security are traded the person whose
sell order happened to cross the insider's buy order should
recover damages while the seller whose order preceded or
followed that order by an instant is able to recover nothing
even though he is equally harmed by the non-disclosure.
Sommer, supra note 58, at 1047.
87. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 A.D.2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st
Dept. 1968), where the court found that a cause of action was stated
by a stockholder who alleged that the officer-directors sold shares to
third persons on the basis of inside information. Finding that the stock-
holders derivative suit could stand, the court said such trading could
inflict injury upon the corporation by loss of good will and prestige,
divided interest of the officer-directors, and competing sales in the
market had the company been planning to sell stock.
88. See H. BLACK, THE WATCHDOGS OF WALL STREET 222, 228-31
(1962).
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Since it is difficult for a private investor to identify the parties
involved, he must necessarily rely to a large extent upon the
investigations of the exchanges and the SEC.
(c) Basis for recommendation
Proving that inside information influenced the analyst's
recommendations may be very difficult. While courts have
assisted the plaintiff by finding that the defendant has created
substantial evidence against himself by trading in the stock,
only unusual activity coupled with some evidence of possession
of the information has been held to establish a presumption of
misconduct."9 This presumption must be very carefully applied
to the security analyst since the analyst is in the business of
acting on information. Furthermore, because his function is in
the public interest, he should be able to perform it without
being unduly subjected to burdensome damage awards. There-
fore, before finding the analyst liable, courts should be fully
satisfied that he both possessed inside information and recom-
mended on the basis of it. A device of proof which could assist
either the plaintiff or defendant would be the analyst's "work
papers," which often include results of the analyst's interviews
with company officials, mathematical analyses of the company's
strength and written subjective judgments.90 Thus, on the basis
of this device, the analyst might successfully rebut the con-
tention that his recommendation was based on items received
from an insider, and show instead that it was the result of
expert evaluation of outside information. If the SEC should
deem the problem of proof particularly troublesome, it could
initiate a practice whereby the work papers could be subpoenaed
for court examination."'
89. We are satisfied that these purchases .... coupled with
his readily inferable and probably reliable, understanding of
the highly favorable nature of preliminary operations on the
Kidd segment, demonstrate that Huntington possessed ma-
terial inside information such as to make his purchase vio-
lative of the Rule and the Act.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853 (2d Cir. 1968).
90. An individual analyst usually handles the analysis of securities
of only one or two industries. He might also take several companies
located in his area. He keeps a file on each company, complete with
financial data, news releases and results of personal interviews.
91. Under § 21(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC may
"administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their
attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any books,
papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records which the Com-
mission deems relevant or material to the inquiry." 15 U.S.C. 78u(b)
(1964). The SEC may also prescribe which books and records the in-
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(d) Materiality of information
Proving the materiality of the inside information may also
be a vexing problem. In seeking to avoid the subjectivity of the
materiality test,92 courts have sometimes hinted that if dis-
closure causes a price change in the stock, the information is
material.93 Although such a test would usually be feasible and
accurate, it may fail in its objective. The fact of a change in
the stock upon disclosure of the information does not neces-
sarily indicate that the news was material since if a large in-
vestor, such as a mutual fund, were cn the brink of a decision to
purchase, a recommendation based upon an item of relatively un-
important news could produce a purchase decision. Thus, courts
must guard against blind adherence to a price change test for
materiality. The analyst would likely be injured more than most
defendants by an improper application of the materiality re-
quirement because of his public interest role and because of the
extent to which he may be liable.9 4
If the defendant trades in a compamy's stock while possessing
inside information, courts have found this to be evidence that
the information is material. 95 Use of such evidence where the
defendant is an analyst, however, would be improper since the
analyst's job is to recommend, and therefore, he is likely to
vestment advisor must keep and submit for inspection when necessary
to protect investors. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(1964). See also Rule 204-2, promulgated thereunder. 17 C.F.R. § 275.
204-2 (1969).
The SEC's "Bookkeeping Rule," applicable to investment advisors,
requires that if a published bulletin does not contain the reasons for a
recommendation, the advisor must keep a separate memorandum "indi-
cating the reasons therefor." Advisors Act Rel. No. 149 (Sept. 10, 1963).
Analysts at J. Barth & Co., a San Francisco brokerage house,
now keep detailed records of all their conversations with
sources, both in and out of the companies they cover. [This]
... assures the brokerage house that every possible source
was tapped in making a report-and also provides a record
should the Securities and Exchange Commission ever ask
where Barth gets its information.
The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
92. An item of information is material if a reasonable man would
attach importance to it in determining his choice of action. See text
accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
93. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847 (2d Cir.
1968); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 909, 910 (1961).
94. A market price change test of materiality has been suggested.
See note 60 supra. If such a test were adopted, it would seem that the
the presumption thereby established should be a rebuttable one. Thus,
testimony that the mutual fund had been on the brink of a purchase
would be admitted.
95. See note 89 supra.
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recommend on the basis of information which is slightly favorable
or unfavorable but not "material" information. Furthermore,
clients are likely to trade on the basis of the advice given
merely because the analyst gave it. Thus, whether or not the
client trades is likely to measure his confidence in the analyst's
judgment but not the materiality of the information.
(e) Proper conduct
Another difficulty concerns the proper conduct for an
analyst if he has received material inside information but cannot
induce the company to publicize the news. Companies may often
be justified in refusing to disclose the inside information.
The analyst may, of course, make a public disclosure himself
and thereafter trade in or recommend trading the security, but
such conduct would in some circumstances match the impro-
priety, though not the illegality, of trading without disclosure.
Assuming the analyst does not publicly disclose the infor-
mation, the question remains as to whether he must follow the
mandate of the courts and completely "refrain from trading or
recommending" the security.
It could be argued that Texas Gulf Sulphurs warning against
recommendation was aimed solely at the casual advisor, and not
the professional. Thus, under this reading, the warning would
apply only to the nonanalyst defendant, and while the analyst
or his co-analyst or a broker would still violate Rule 10b-5 by
recommending on the basis of material inside information, he
need not completely withdraw from the recommendation busi-
ness. So long as his recommendation is not influenced by knowl-
edge of the material inside information, no liability will ensue.
This solution has the advantage of allowing more freedom to
the firm which finds such action necessary to prevent disruption
of its normal business operations.9 6 However, if this consider-
ation is not critical, the firm is likely to refrain from trading or
recommending, thereby eliminating any risk of liability. Thus,
the firm must balance expected return against the inherent
risk.
(f) Remedies available
The remedies available vary with the party seeking relief.
The Securities and Exchange Commission may use fines, sus-
pensions and censures against brokerage firms and investment
96. See generally Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady,
Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939 (1962).
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advisory services registered with it.1 It may also investigate
violations and publish its findings,98 request injunctions against
further violations,99 and, for more flagrant abuses, inform the
Attorney General of the United States for possible criminal
prosecution.100 The most significant remedy, however, may be
an award of damages in a civil action. Although recommending
a stock on the basis of inside information violates Rule 10b-5,' 10
whether an analyst doing so will be subject to a suit for damages
is still an open question.10 2 When considering the liberal inter-
pretation given Rule 10b-5 thus far, however, courts can prob-
ably be expected to allow damage suits against analysts.
The standard most frequently used for measuring damages
has been the "out-of-pocket" test,103 under which the plaintiff
is entitled to the difference between the price at which he
bought or sold the security and the actual value at the date of
the transaction. This standard would seem appropriate in the
traditional face-to-face transaction where one or more plain-
tiffs is defrauded by one or more defendants, since the amount of
loss to the plaintiffs equals the amount of gain to the defendants.
Where the defendants trade shares on an exchange, however,
the total loss to investors would probably far exceed the gain to
the defendants and to hold the defendants liable for all the
plaintiffs' losses would indeed be a frightening spectre. 0 4 Thus,
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(e), 78o, 80b-3(d), 80b-9(e) (1964).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1964).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964). Borderline defendants usually are not
subjected to this sanction. See United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928,
938-43 (2d Cir. 1961); 3 L. Loss, SECURITrus REGULATION 1993 (2d ed.
1961). For a discussion of the remedies the Commission has at its dis-
posal, see Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule 10b-5 Duty to Dis-
close Material Information-Remedies and fhe Texas Gulf Sulphur Case,
65 McH. L. REv. 944 (1967).
101. See note 54 supra.
102. It is also an open question wheiher one trading on a stock
exchange is liable in money damages. That one will be found to be
liable, however, seems to be a foregone conclusion among the commen-
tators. The writings have thus dealt mainly with the problems of who
can sue and the measure of damages. See, e.g., Note, Insiders' Liability
Under Rule lOb-5 for the Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded Securities,
78 YALE L.J. 864 (1969); Note, A Suggested Locus of Recovery in Na-
tional Exchange Violations of Rule 10b-5, 54 CoRxELL L.Q. 306 (1969).
103. E.g., Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); Mills v. Sarjem
Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 770 (D.N.$. 1955); See generally Note, Measure-
ment of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule lob-5, 1968 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 165.
104. See W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATMON OF INSIDER TRAINING 111
(1968).
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courts might well limit the damage award to the defendants'
gains. Assuming such a standard is established, the most im-
portant aspect of the damages problem for the analyst still con-
cerns the extent to which he may be liable.
While one who recommends to others has been found to
violate Rule 10b-5 just as one who trades for himself, 0 5 the prob-
lem of a measure for damages is compounded. The analyst does
little else besides recommend and his recommendations may re-
sult in trades totaling thousands of shares; thus, he would be
peculiarly vulnerable to any rule holding one who recommends
monetarily liable for the gains derived by investors using his
advice. Of course, the analyst who learns of a mineral discovery
from an insider and proceeds to recommend with knowledge of
the serious consequences should not be heard to complain. How-
ever, an analyst's conduct, as illustrated in several hypothetical
cases above, may not involve such a flagrant misuse of infor-
mation. If and when such a case arises, the court and the parties
would have several possible alternatives: full money-damage
liability; no money-damage liability; or a suit over'0 6 against
either the profiting tippee or the divulging insider. In addition,
Congress or the Securities and Exchange Commission could pre-
scribe a different rule, such as censuring, disassociation of the
analyst from his firm, a flat fine or damages to the extent of
one-half of the actual damages.
B. THE NEWS BLACKOUT
After the decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur and the commence-
ment of action against Merrill Lynch, the traditional flow of in-
formation through the business community became partially
paralyzed. The uncertainty caused business officials to ask
what news can, must, or should be disclosed.1'07 Since the duty
to disclose means the duty to publicize, and to publicize every-
thing discussed between a manager and an analyst would be
impractical, some corporations cancelled interviews with indi-
vidual analysts and presentations before groups of analysts. 08
105. See note 54 supra.
106. See Bromberg, supra note 60, at 995.
107. See The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1968, at 1, col. 6. See
generally Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HAnv. L. REV. 1340
(1966). In addition, the Texas Gulf Sulphur court found that a corpora-
tion itself could violate Rule lOb-5 by issuing a misleading press re-
lease. See note 47 supra.
108. See The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 20, 1968, at 6, col. 4, where it
was reported that the reaction by companies included cancellation of
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Many others, while continuing to maintain contact with analysts,
answered fewer questions. While much of the stoppage was
undoubtedly due to fear of liability, some refusals were prob-
ably based upon the company's predisposed yearning to maintain
a veil of secrecy and thus, the new 'fear" provided a handy ex-
cuse. 0 9
Recognizing that a constricted information inflow caused a
less accurately evaluated outflow, the Financial Analysts Fed-
eration pleaded with corporate officials to maintain an open
door policy and the SEC clearly concurred." 0 Such attempts to
reopen the corporate door, however, have not been completely
successful."' Because of the possibility that the goal of the
securities laws-an informed investing public-may be under-
mined by their very own enforcemer.t, the types of information
which may be lawfully provided to analysts must be clearly
established and corporate officials must be encouraged to main-
tain contact with the security analyst. Especially helpful would
be the development of general guidelines which both explain
the state of securities law and the legal rules involved, and also
provide direction in regard to which matters can and should be
discussed with the analyst. For example, one or more of the
stock exchanges might undertake such a project" 2 after con-
a scheduled appearance before an analysts group, cancellation of a series
of luncheon meetings with analysts, and cancellation of a field trip and
management conference for analysts. Some companies were found to
have cancelled visits with analysts indefinitely while others declared a
30 to 60 day moratorium. See also The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 16,
1968, at 1, col. 6, which indicated that some executives were unwilling
to provide anything but routine information to analysts.
109. The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 2), 1968, at 6, col. 4. George
S. Bissell, president of the Financial Analysts Federation, was reported
as saying that analysts are using the recent developments as a "ready
excuse to hide from the spotlight of shareholder inspection and evalu-
ation."
110. See The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 20, 1968, at 6, col. 3-4; The
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 11, 1968, at 4, col. 1.
111. Interview with John Tauer, Jr., security analyst at the broker-
age firm of Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, in Minneapolis, Minn., Sept. 4,
1969. See The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
112. See, e.g., N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL § A-2, Listing Agreement,
which requires
[tlimely disclosure, to the public and to the Exchange of infor-
mation which may affect security value; or influence investment
decisions, and in which stockholders, the public and the Ex-
change have a warrantable interest.
Numerous duties are imposed upon listed companies by both
national and all regional exchanges. In light of the recent developments,
the exchanges have been reevaluating their regulations and in particular
the disclosure requirements. For example, Ralph S. Saul, president of
the American Stock Exchange, said that the AMEX is reviewing its policy
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sultation with the interested parties, including the SEC, the
analysts, the National Association of Securities Dealers" 3 and
the corporate community.
Of course, until Rule 10b-5 is further delineated by the
courts, complete and definitive guidelines cannot be provided to
the corporate official. At the same time, however, reasonable
and well considered proposals for conduct, especially if made
with the blessing of the SEC, might provide some guidance for
the courts, as well as analysts and corporate managers.
V. CONCLUSION
Rule 10b-5 was adopted in 1942 without overtones of caprice
and was accepted without undercurrents of alarm. It remained
substantially innocuous until the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission expanded its scope with respect to insider trading mal-
practices in the 1961 Cady, Roberts case. Thus defined, the
Rule's application in Texas G f Sulphur did not represent a
"full grown monster which suddenly descended upon the fi-
nancial community on a hot summer evening in August, 1968."114
Instead, the decision ratified the SEC's declarations and sup-
ported its readiness to apply the rule in additional circum-
stances. The fallout affected everyone with access to inside in-
formation, including the corporate official, director and em-
ployee, the underwriter and the security analyst. The security
analyst found himself in a particular dilemma, shut off from
corporate information necessary to his work, and subject to
potential liability for any information he did receive.
While reopening the corporate door is the necessary solution
to the first problem, it will probably be more easily accomplished
than resolving the analyst's field of liability in an attempt to
deal with the second problem. Assigning liability to certain
conduct of the analyst requires a consideration of the scope of the
present rule against trading on inside information, its underlying
with the hope that additional guidelines for listed companies, member
firms, and analysts may be developed. He said that AMEX is "seeking
to identify the questions that most puzzle corporate management, law-
yers, public relations counsel and others, to ask ourselves tough ques-
tions and to provide answers to interpret what the exchange considers
proper disclosure." The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1968, at 7, col. 2.
113. The NASD, a semi-official association of most brokers and
dealers, regulates the over-the-counter market. See 2 L. Loss, SE-
cURITIEs REGULATION 1365-91 (2d ed. 1961).
114. W. PAINTER, supra note 104, at vii. Painter says that the use
of Rule 10b-5 in Texas Gulf Sulphur signals an "unfolding chrysalis" of
federal securities law and not a declaration of new liabilities.
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purposes and a survey of the practicalities involved. On one
side of the balance is the public policy of investor protection.
On the other side is the extent to which the particular conduct
advances or hinders that policy. M/ost conduct advances that
policy by providing an information conduit to the investing pub-
lic, accompanied by expert evaluation of that information. The
conduct which undermines that policy is akin to that of the
traditional abuse by an insider. These considerations should be
injected into the evolving framework to determine the question
of whether there has been analyst misconduct. Failure to in-
corporate these considerations will counteract the goal of the
securities laws themselves.
